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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ERNEST E. BLAKE1
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Case No. 15668

HUBERT C. LAMBERT) STATE ENGINEER)
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was initiated pursuant to the provisions of
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, to review a decision of the State Engineer denying Appellant further
extension of time to complete his appropriation of water under
Applications Nos.
Applications.

33554,

35444 and 36370, and lapsing these

Appellant is seeking a reinstatement of said

Applications and a further extension of

t~rne

for each Applica-

tlon.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court ruled that Appellant had failed to show
due diligence or reasonable cause for delay in completing his
appropriation of water under Applications "os.

33554, 35444 and

36570, and therefore was not entitled to further extensions of
t~me.

The Court upheld the decision of the State Engineer deny-

ing ,'\.ppellant' s request for additlonal time and lapsing these
Applicatlons.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the Trial Court
was correct and proper in all respects

an~

should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with most of the facts set forth in
Appellant's Brief concerning Applications Nos. 33554, 35444,
and 36570, but disagrees with some of the conclusions made there·
in.

Further, there are certain additional facts that

Appell~t

has omitted which are relevant to the Court's consideration of
this matter.

It is believed that the following surr®ary of each

of the three Applications involved in this appeal will be helpful in evaluating the legal arguments which follow.
By way of introduction, it should be pointed out that 11hen
an application to appropriate water is approved, the applicant
is given a specific time within which to place the water to

be~e

ficial use and submit proof of appropriation (§73-3-10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended).

At this point, the applicant

may submit his proof of appropriation if he has completed his
project, or he may request an extension of time within which to
do so.

All requests for extensions of time must be by affida-

vit ( § 7 3-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as amended) , and the
State Engineer--upon a proper showing of diligence in completing the project or a reasonable cause for delay--may grant the
applicant an extension of time.

Thus, it is these extension

requests that contain the basic evidence from which it must be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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determined whether the applicant has been diligent.

These

requests are contained on Appellant's three Application files.
On the front of each file is a chronological summary showing
the dates of the various extensions granted by the State Engineer and the requests for further extension extracted from
Appellant's extension requests.

The documents described on

the summary sheets are contained within the Application files,
and are tabbed with numbers corresponding to the number given
each document listed on the summary sheets.
Application No.

35444

(Ex.

For example, on

3), Appellant's third extension re-

quest is identified and summarized as Item No.

4, with tab num-

ber 4 being attached to the extension request itself.
Appellant's Applications can be summarized as follows:
No.

1:

Application No.

36570

(Ex.

2)

-- This Application

sought to appropriate 3 c.f.s. of water for irrigation, domestic and stockwaterinc; :=;Jrt='GSes by means
of drains located in Wide Canyon, Washington County.
This Application was approved by the State Engineer
on July 11, 1966.
l,

2,

4 & 6)

Appellant requested (Ex.

2, Tabs

and received four separate extensions

of time to complete this project covering a period
of approximately

6~

years

(Ex.

2, Tabs l,

3, 5 & 7)

Appellant's final extension request stated that in
excess of $200.00 worth of development ".-JOrk had been
done on the proJect,

and estlmated that it would

cost about $1,300.00 to complete the project
Tab 7).

However,

(Ex.

2,

thls $200.00 had been expended

dur1ng ~r1or extens1on per1ods

(Ex. 2, Tab 21.

Rea-

sons oiven for requestlno ~urther extension were that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant had been involved in a drawn-out divorce
and had been prevented from completing his project
because of conditions prescribed by the Bureau of
Land Management and the State Engineer.

On January

12, 1973, the State Engineer denied Appellant any
further extension of time and lapsed this Application.
No. 2:

Application No. 35444 (Ex.

This Application

3)

sought to appropriate .50 c.f.s. of water for domestic,
stockwatering, and irrigation purposes from Rock Hollow
Wash in Washington County.

This Application was

approved by the State Engineer on February 11, 1965
(Ex. 3, Tab 1).

Appellant requested (Ex.

3, Tabs 1,

2, 4 & 6) and received four separate extensions of time
covering a period of approximately eight years
Tabs 1, 3, 5 & 7).

(Ex. 3,

Appellant's last extension request

stated that about $400.00 worth of development work
had been done on this project to install a collection
box, some drain tile and plastic pipe, but that Appellant had not been able to complete the project because
of a drawn-out divorce action and conditions prescribed
by the Bureau of Land Management and the State Engineer
(Ex. 3, Tab 8).

However, the work accomplished had been

done under earlier extension requests
and 4).

(Ex.

3, Tabs 2

The State Engineer, by Memorandum Decision

dated January 12, 1973, denied Appellant any further
extension of time and lapsed this Application.
No. 3:

Application No.

33554 (Ex. 4)

-- This Application sought

to appropriate 1 c.f.s. of water for irrigation and
stockwatering purposes from certain open cuts located
in Section 35, Township 40 South, Range 16 West, SLB&~L
in Washington County.

This Application was approved on

November 23, 1962 (Ex.

4, Tab 1).

(Ex. 4, Tabs 1, 2, 5 & 7)

Appellant requested

and received five separate
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extensions of time covering a period of approximately
ten years

(Ex. 4, Tabs 1, 3, 4, 6 & 9).

Appellant's

final extension request stated that caterpillar, other
machine, and well development work had been done at a
cost in excess of $2,100.00, and that the estimated
cost of completing the project was $3,800.00.

Reasons

given for not completing the project were the same as
for the other two Applications.

It must be noted, how-

ever, that the bulk of Appellant's $2,100.00 expenditure was for the drilling of a well which he had begun
some years earlier (Ex.

4, Tab 5) and which was not

covered by this Application (T.
8-A through -D).

37-39; Ex. 4, Tabs

The Trial Court concluded that funds

expended outside the scope of Appellant's project could
not be considered in the evaluation of Appellant's diligence in completing his approved project (R. 40, 44).
The foregoing is a brief summary of the history and development of Appellant's three Applications, as summarized from Appellant's Affidavits and the State Engineer's files.

Appellant

testified that all of his costs and some of the work he had done
himself were not reflected in his extension requests

(T. 24, 26).

An addltional factual matter--and one of primary importance
in evaluating Appellant's extension requests--is that Appellant
never obtained the rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management necessary to develop the water sources involved in these
three Applications and to convey the water to its place of use
(R.

33;

T.

40-42).

Further, in the Pre-Trial Order it was stip-

ulated that Appellant was not the owner nor in possession of
the land

'tJhere

the water 'tJas ?reposed to be used under said
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Applications (R.

33).

There are unapproved applications located in the general
vicinity of Appellant's Applications.

Appe~lant

has three un-

approved applications by which he seeks to appropriate a total
of 31 c.f.s. of water (Exs. 5, 6 & 7).
dividuals in this same situation.

There are also other in-

Exhibit No.

8 contains four

separate unapproved applications by other individuals seeking
to appropriate water in this area.

The State Engineer testified

that a question exists as to whether there is unappropriated
water in this vicinity, and that part of this uncertainty is
not knowing whether Appellant would ever perfect the three
Applications which are the subject of this appeal (T. 55-58).
These other applicants are anxious to have an opportunity to
proceed with their applications (T. 58).
Respondent will reply to the points raised in Appellant's
Brief in the order in which they are set forth therein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE OR REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY IN PERFECTING APPLICATIONS
NOS. 33554, 35444 AND 36570, AND THE TRIAL COCRT
PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT cm1PLIED
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-3-12, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED.
A.

Purpose of and Need for Due Diligence Requirements
The requirement that an appropriator of water proceed

with due diligence or show reasonable cause for delay in ?erfec:·
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ing his appropriation is one of the fundamental principles of
the appropriation doctrine.

Even before the Western States

adopted their water codes, various courts had ruled that in
order for an appropriator to perfect a water right and maintain
a priority date relating back to when his appropriation was initiated, he must proceed with due and reasonable diligence to
place the water to beneficial use
Canal Co. v. Kidd,
371, l7 Pac.

453

37 Cal. 282

(1888)).

(Nevada County & Sacramento

(1869); Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz.

This concept was bottomed on the

sound and practical premise that development and utilization
of the very limited water resources was so critical to the development of other resources and the overall
no one should be
~od

ent~tled

publ~c

interes'-

~~at

to tie up water for an extensive per-

of time without placing it to a beneficial use.

words, if a proposed appropriator was

unab~e

In other

tc develop this

public resource within a reasonable time, others should be
given the opportunity to do so.

This requirement was sound

when it was adopted, and is even more relevant today with the
tremendous demands that are being placed on our limited unappropriated water.

This Court recognized this principle in

the case of Carbon Canal Co.
Ut.2d 6, 425 P.2d 405

(1967).

v. Sanpete Water Users Assoc., 19
At page 9 of the Gtah Reporter

1t is stated:
Sanpete's successful extensions for decades leaving
but few years to go, ~mpel tjis court, in a conceded
equl~! case, tc canvass the facts to determine if,
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in this arid state, where a drop of water is a
drop of gold, one, by extension after extension,
may equitably prevent beneficial use of water by
others through procedural stagnation for about
forty years. We think not,
Appellant has been given more than ample time to utilize
this public resource, and other potential appropriators are
anxiously awaiting an opportunity to develop the limited water
supply in this area (Ex.
B.

8; T. 58).

Section 73-3-12 and the Test for Determining Diligence
As the various States adopted their water codes, the

due diligence requirement in perfecting approved applications
formed a part of the states' statutory water law.

In Utah,

this requirement is found in Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

Once the State Engineer determines

that an application should be approved under the provisions of
Section 73-3-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, the

appl~-

cant is given a specific time within which to construct his pro·
ject, place the water to beneficial use and submit proof of
appropriation (§73-3-10, supra).

An applicant's time for accom·

plishing this can be extended under the provisions of §73-3-12
upon a proper showing of diligence or reasonable cause for delay . .Y
1. Since an amendment to this Section in 1975, an applicant
has the responsibility of affirmativel'! shm1ing that he has
exercised or is exercising reasonable and due dillgence towar~
the completion of his appropriation, and extenslons gran ted b:·
the State Engineer shall be effective so long as the app~lc~nt
shall continue to exercise reasonable diligence i~ comoletl~S
his project (Section 73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953~ as
amended).
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This Court has ruled that the determination of diligence or
reasonable cause for delay for an approved application under
§73-3-12 is essentially a question of fact.

This test was an-

nounced in the first Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users
Assoc.

case,

10 Ut.2d 376,

353 P.2d 916

(1960):

Whether due diligence has been used or there has
been reasonable delay in commencing the constructlon of works to appropriate water under an application is a question of fact to be determined from
all the circumstances surrounding each particular
case.
\mat acts might reasonably be found to be
due diligence under one set of circumstances might
not under other conditions.
The real criterion
appears to be the bona fides of the attempt to
approprlate which mlght be pursued with all the
expedition and constant effort to a<::<::orr.plish the
undertakinc; which ::.s usual "in men engac;ed ::.:: li'•2
enterprises, and who desire a speedy accomplislun"":.·~
of their designs"
(10 Ct.2d at 37S).
This test was amplifled in the second Carbon Canal Co. v.
Sanpete Water Users .:l.ssoc. case, 19 L't.2c ;; ,
wherein it ...,as stated

t~at

~2S

P. 2d 405

(1967),

ne::.ther lack :.: ::.mc.s to complete the

project nor ill health would dispense w::.th the necessity of actually placing the '"'ater to beneficial use wit..Y1in a reasonable
time.

Because of the importance of water de•1elopment in this

State, the Court further pointed out that the applicant has a
substantial burden of demonstratlng facts wr. .:.ch ·.vould justify
a further extenslon of t.:.me:
We thlnk t~e ev.:.dence ~resented ::.n either or both
cf tne cases -.:om:2els us to resolve the doubt ln
favor of due d::.l~cence ::.n exoedi tlous development
of water, and nat..-.:.n favor oi the delay reflected
ln the ~acts de~elcped, ~est of whlch were inadmlss.:.ols, hav.:.nc occurred 3:ter the extension had
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expired.
In the light of this principle, we hold
that the applicant proved neither the required
diligence nor a reasonable excuse for delay by
that hi h t
e of convincing evidence demanded in
water development cases
19 Ut.2 at 8) (Emphasis
Added).
Later, in the same opinion, the Court noted that the applicant had not sustained its burden of showing that it was entitled to a further extension of time "

. by that high degree

of quantitative and qualitative proof necessary in cases having
to do with such water rights"

(19 Ut.2d at 9).

Since the facts are so important in determining whether an
applicant is entitled to a further extension of time, it is now
time to look at the facts upon which Appellant relies and see
if he has met his burden with the "high degree" of proof required in extension cases.
C.

The Facts of this Case Fall Short of Showing that
Appellant is Entitled to Additional Time
The evidence in this case, which fully supports the

Findings and Decree of the Trial Court, overwhelmingly shows
that Appellant has not proceeded with due diligence or shown
reasonable cause for delay on any of the three Applications
involved in this appeal.
1.

Development Cannot be Made under Existing Conditions
One of Appellant's primary reasons for clalming

that he is entitled to further extensions of time on these
three Applications is because of his inability to secure the
necessary rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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develop the water sources involved.

In order to secure water

at the points of diversion covered by the three subJect Applications and transport that water to the place where Appellant intends to use it, it is necessary to secure rights-of-way from
the Bureau of Land Management.
these rights-of-way

has

were approved (Exs. 2,

Appellant's inability to secure

existed ever since these Applications

3 & 4) and, while Appellant has made cer-

tain efforts to secure these rights-of-way, the fact is he has
been unable to do so (R.

33), and has no present prospect for

obtaining such rights-of-way (T.

40-42).

In other words, Appel-

lant was no closer to solving this problem when !'lis last extension request was denied that he was when the
approved.

Appl~cations

Nere

Applicant has had a substantial amount of time to

solve this problem, but has made no appreciable progress toward
solving it (Appellant did secure a special lar.d ·.:se permit for
a one-year period in 1969, but this was for a well site which
was not covered by any of Appellant's three Applications (Ex.
ll)).

Without these rights-of-way, Appellant will never be able

to perfect these Applications.

While an applicant should be

given a reasonable time to secure the easements necessary to
develop his project, suc!'l delays should not be allowed to tie
up a water source for an extended period of time.

This is par-

ticularlj true where ot!'ler applicants are waiting for an opporturu ty to use t!'le available water supply.
~ot

onl/ lS .::l.ppellant wlthout the r.:.ghts-of-way necessary
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for his project, but at the time of the Pre-Trial of this matte:,
Appellant had lost whatever interest he may have had in the lane
where he proposes to use the water.

In the Pre-Trial Order en-

tered on June 13, 1977, it was stipulated by the parties that:
The Plaintiff [Appellant] is not the owner of record,
nor is he in possession of any leases or rights-ofway which give him possession or control of the land
where the various points of diversion are located or
where the water is to be used under said Applications.
Following the Pre-Trial, Appellant did secure two leases for
property in this area.

However, the one lease--which is for a

five-year period--does not cover the place of use described in
any of the three subject Applications
(for only ten acres of land)

(Ex. 14).

The second lease

is only for a period of one year

with an option to purchase (Ex. 13) .

However, both of these doc·

uments are irrelevant to Appellant's last extension request
(which expired on November 30, 1972), and were objected to on
that basis (T. 79).

This Court concluded in the second carbon

Canal Co. case that efforts made or work done after the expiration of an extension period were immaterial (19 ut.2d at ll).
This was the view of the Trial Court (T. 10).

"'hese docu1uents

were admitted simply to show what had transpired after the PreTrial Order had been entered (T. 77), but not to show diligence
during the relevant period of time (T. 77).
2.

Appellant's Domestic Problems are not a Bas1s
for Further Extensions
Appellant's other reason given in his last extens1or.

request to the State Engineer was that he had been 1 nvclved
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1n

a long, drawn-out divorce action.

This, of course, could have

no direct bearing on his inability to secure the necessary
rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land Management.

Appellant

did not state in his extension request how this divorce action
prevented his completing the development of these Applications,
and did not amplify this matter to any degree in his testimony
at the Trial.

The great bulk of his testimony centered around

his problems with the Bureau of Land Management.

It appears

mat his domestic difficulties contrlbuted to problems with his
nerves

(T.

27), and presumably the dlvorce action placed an

additional financial strain on him.

However,

pointed out by

~s

this Court, health and financial problems ·,all

:-~ot

ser''"'

~-

~

basis for continued extenslons of time (Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanoete Water

~sers

'ler Mining Co.

Assoc., 19 Ut.2d at 12)

v. Carpenter,

4 :<lev. 534

Also, see Ophir Sil.:.36::.

Countv Municioal Water Conservancy Dist.
Cotton Co., 39 Ariz.

65,

.J P. 2d 360

~o.

1 ,

and Maricopa

1 v. Southwest
From Appellant's

(1931).

failure to clarify how hls divorce problems prevented the development of hls Applications, it can only be assumed that this
matter was secondarJ to his ?roblems

wit~

the Bureau of Land

Management.
3.

An Extension Cannot be Justif1ed
Past Expenditures

0:1

Appellant's

.:"\poellant 'las onl:.: made a very modest i:1vestrnent
ln the sub~ect .:"\p~l1ca:::.cns

O'.'e!"

and h1s expend1tures on ::'lese

a substantial period of time,

Ap~i_catlons

do not

justif~

any
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further extension of time.

This is clearly demonstrated by

Appellant's own sworn extension requests:
(1)

Application No.

36570 -- Appellant was granted

four separate extension requests on this Application, covering
a period of time from July 11, 1966 (when the Application was
approved) to November 30, 1972 (when the last extension period
expired) .
years.

This is a period of approximately six and one-half

Appellant's last extension request recites that approx-

imately $200.00 had been spent on development work and that the
estimated cost of completing the project would be $1,500.00.
Thus, according to Appellant, the total cost of the project
would be $1,700.00.

During the

6~

years this Application was

approved, Appellant completed approximately one-eighth of the
work on the project for an average expenditure of less than
$33.00 per year.

At that rate, another 45 years would be re-

quired to complete the project:

Further, the $200.00 was spent

during an earlier extension period (Ex. 2, Tab 2), and there is
no evidence that Appellant expended any additional funds during
the period prior to the denial of further extension of time.
It is extremely difficult to see how Appellant believes these
facts justify any further extension of time for this Application.
(2)

Application No.

35444 -- Appellant was also

granted four separate extensions of time on this fillng.

ThlS

Application was approved on February 11, 1965, and the last ex-
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tension expired November 30, 1972.
short of eight years.

This covers a period just

Appellant's last extension request (Ex.

3, Tab 8) states that $400.00 worth of work had been done on
the project.

Thus, during a period of approximately eight years,

Appellant spent $400.00, for an average of approximately $50.00
per year.

Further, from a description of the work done, it seems

clear that these funds were expended during prior extension periods (Ex. 3, compare Tabs 2 & 3 with Tab 8).

The expenditure of

an average of $50.00 a year--with no expenditure at all during
the final extension period--cannot serve as justification for a
further extension of time.
(3)

Application No.

33554 -- This Appllcation was

approved November 23, 1962, and Appellant has since been granted
five extensions covering a period of approximately ten years.
Appellant's latest extension

reques~

$2,100.00 had been expended (Ex.

states that approximately

4, Tab 10), although part of

this appears to have been expended during prior extension periods (Ex.

4, Tab 5).

At the Trial, Appellant estimated he had

spent more than the $2,100.00 on this well development (T. 2021).

However, the relevant point to be made here is that the

bulk of this money was spent for the drl11ing of a well which
was outside the scope of thls project (T.
Court correctly ruled (R. 49)

~hat

35-39).

The Trial

funds spent outside the scope

of the project covered by Appe:1ant's approved Application could
not be consldered in

eva1ua~l~g

9ast diligence, and Appellant
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has not disputed this.

This leaves Appellant with an extremely

modest financial showing for an Application approved for a
decade.
At the Trial, Appellant estimated his total investment in
these three Applications as somewhat higher than shown on his
extension requests (T. 20-21), but--as pointed out above--the
bulk of these additional funds were spent on a well which was
outside the scope of Appellant's approved Applications
38).

(T.

35-

Also, Appellant's estimate included money spent on attor-

ney's fees relating to his trespass problems with the Bureau of
Land Management, and Appellant concedes that this expenditure
should not be included in the funds expended on these Applications (T.

43-44).

Further, Appellant conceded on cross-examina-

tion that in terms of dollars spent, the $200.00 on Application
No.

36570 and the $400.00 on Application No.

ate figures

35444 were accur-

(T. 41-42) .

The money spent on diversion works authorized by these Applications shows an extremely modest investment by Appellant to
tie up a total of 4.5 c.f.s. of water for such an extended ?eriod of time.

Certainly this investment falls far short of dem-

onstrating due diligence or reasonable cause for delay by the
" . . . high type of convincing evidence demanded in water development cases"

(Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Assos_,

19 Ut. 2d at 8.
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4.

Appellant has not Met the Standard Required for
Projects of this Nature
On page ll of his Brief, Appellant asserts that the

State Engineer is exacting too much diligence from applicants.
This is not true, but it is true that the State Engineer is requiring relatively small projects such as this to be completed
without undue delay.

This is proper with the ever-increasing

demands for the available water supply in this State; and particularly so where other potential applicants are awaiting an
opportunity to develop the water.

Appellant complains that the

State Engineer is too harsh in his requirement that no more time
be allowed for these Applications, and that the State Engineer
has no uniform standard for evaluating extenslon
is not so.

~e~-~sts.

This

The State Engineer testified at length that nothing

is being required of Appellant that is not required of other
applicants with similar

~rejects,

and

~hat

a uniform policy ex-

ists for all appllcations of this nature (T.

47-54).

The plain

fact is that Appellant lS no closer to solving his right-of-way
problems with the Bureau of Land Management today than he was
on the day his Applications were approved, and his prior expenditures on these .:l.pplications does not JUStify further delay.
Appellant suggests that slnce Section 73-3-12 allows the
State Englneer to grant extenslons

~or

up to

fi~ty

should be more generous than he is on applications.

years, he
Certainly

there are a ~e'"' sit·-.~at::.ons '"'hlch ma:.: ]UStify this kind of time-
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such as the multi-million-dollar Central Utah Project--but
even then substantial progress on development must be shown.
To allow small and relatively inexpen5ive projects to tie up
water for an extended period of time without development would
totally frustrate water development in this State and is clearly
at odds with the due diligence mandate of Section 73-3-12.
POINT II
DENIAL OF ANY FURTHER EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPELLANT'S THREE APPLICATIONS IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE
FACTS, EVEN THOUGH THESE APPLICATIONS HAD NOT BEEN
APPROVED FOR THE SAME PERIODS OF TIME
Appellant states under Point II of his Brief that it was
improper for the State Engineer to consider all three Applications together and to lapse them at the same time.

It was

Appellant--and not the State Engineer--who tied the three Applications together.

Throughout the period that Appellant was

making his extension requests, his primary reason for seeking
additional time to develop these Applications was his inability
to obtain the necessary rights-of-way from the Bureau of Land
Management.

In his final extension request he used virtually

identical language for each Application --his problems with the
Bureau of Land Management and his drawn-out divorce action (Ex.
2, Tab 8; Ex. 3, Tab 8; Ex. 4, Tab 10).

The State Engineer did

evaluate each Application separately, but Appellant's reasons
for requesting additional time were the same on each filing.
Appellant then goes on to state that the shorter periods given
on two of the three Applications--approximately eight years on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

Application No.

35444 (Ex. 3) and six and one-half years on

Application :<o.

36570 (Ex. 2)--were prejudicial to him.

is most difficult to understand.

This

If Appellant was unable to

solve his problems with the Bureau of Land Management in the
ten-year period he had on Application No. 33554 (Ex. 4), there
is certainly no basis to suggest that he could have done so on
the other two Applications in the same amount of time, and
Appellant has suggested none.

Appellant goes on to make the

erroneous argument that he was caught in a cross-fire between
the Bureau of Land Management and the State Engineer because
after the State Engineer denied further extensions of time the
Bureau of Land Management would not grant him the rights-ofway.

What Appellant fails to acknowledge is that the State

Engineer had been extremely generous in granting prior extensions of time to give Appellant ample

opport~nity

problems with the Bureau of Land Management.

to solve his

To now suggest

that Appellant is being treated unfairly by the State Engineer
because of his problems with the Bureau of Land Management is
totally unfounded.

The State Engineer went beyond his usual

procedures on applications of this magnitude to give Appellant
everJ opportunity to resolve his right-of-way problems
65).

(T. 54,

Further, the State Engineer advised Appellant of his

growing concern over the lack of development under
cations.

~~ese

Appli-

On each of these three Applications, in granting the

last extension, the State Engineer advised Appellant in his
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Memorandum Decisions that in light of the past record further
extensions would be critically reviewed, and unless the water
had been utilized further extensions would be denied (Ex.
Tab 7; Ex. 3, Tab 7; Ex. 4, Tab 9).

2,

Appellant goes on to gra-

tuitously state that his past performance--or lack of it--shoul:
not be used the judge what he can accomplish in the future.
However, Appellant fails to point to any evidence or to

develo~

any argument why this is so.
Appellant suggests that the Trial Court would have ruled
differently if Appellant had some assurance that the right-ofway approval would be forthcoming in the future.
is not so.

Again, this

The Trial Court, in accordance with the prior dec1- ,

sion of this Court in the second Carbon Canal Co. case, supra,
properly restricted the evidence and the evaluation of diligenc:
or reasonable cause for delay to the extension period (T. 10).
Further, Appellant can give no such assurances because the Bureau of Land Management has not indicated that he will ever get
such rights-of-way.
Finally, thorughout his Brief, Appellant argues in broad
generalities that the Findings of Fact of the Trial Court are
erroneous and incorrect, but it is significant that Appellant
has not pointed to any specific Finding which he believes to
be improper, nor has he directed the Court's attention to an;·
specific evidence in the record to support his argument.

ThlS

is not surprising, since the F1ndings of the Tr1al Court are

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

fully supported by the evidence.

This Court has repeatedly

held that it will not disturb Findings of Fact of Trial Courts
unless they are clearly erroneous and contrary to the weight of
the evidence (Nunley v. Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 117 (1962)
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Ut.2d 36, 376 P.2d 940
(1962); McBride v. McBride,

P.2d

(June 8, 1978).

Appellant has fallen woefully short of making any showing that
the Findings in this case are not supported by the evidence.
The argument under Point III of Appellant's Brief is nothing
more than an adoption of his arguments under Points I and II of
his Brief.

The arguments developed under

fully responded to abO'Ie, and there is

~o

t~ese

Poi~~s

~ave

been

need to repea': them

under a separate Point.

CONCLUSION
In Ctah, water has been declared by the Legislature to be
public property (Section 73-1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended) .
be

acqu~red

R~ghts

to the use of this public resource can onl:l

as ;:rovlded for in the water code, and the concept

of due diligence in perfecting an approved application forms
an integral part of Utah's basic water law.

Appellant has been

gl'len cnore than ample opportunity to develop these three Applications, but lS no closer to accompllshing thls than when these
Applicatlons were appro'led.
to secure <:.:-.e :1eces3a::-·
w1~t1cut

3~

1~~e~es~

1~

.=In app

l~can t

ri;hts-c:-'Nay
:~e

?rope~~~-

~:.J

'tJho has been unable

utllize the water,

is

where the water is to be
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used, and has made only a modest investment in the development
of his projects over a substantial number of years, has failed
to demonstrate that he is entitled to any further extension of
time by the high degree of proof required by this Court in
water development cases.

Others should have an opportunity to

utilize this public

JENS
Assistant At
Attorney fo
tate Engineer
442 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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